By Samuel Ajayi | On 7^th December 2025, news broke of an attempted coup in neighbouring Republic of Benin, which President Patrice Talon later announced had been foiled. Some of the online reactions to the attempted coup highlighted a disturbing rise in sympathy for military regimes across West Africa. Though Nigeria has been a democracy since 1999, the wider Sahel is seeing a "coup contagion," fuelled by the unfounded belief that democratic governments cannot guarantee security or economic stability.^{[1] [2] [3]}

There seems to be some ambivalence about democratic rule in Nigeria. A recent study by Afrobarometer reveals that while “seven in 10 Nigerians (70%) say democracy is preferable to any other kind of government and more than three-fourths (77%) of Nigerians say they are not satisfied with the way democracy works in the country.” It is this dissatisfaction that seems to be driving the interest of some Nigerians in authoritarian alternatives^[4].

Nevertheless, Nigeria’s democracy, with all its flaws, is worth defending and should be strengthened. While democracy might not have met all expectations, its superiority over alternatives cannot be denied. Nigeria tried military rule for a cumulative period of 29 years from 1966 to 1979 and from 1983 to 1999. On the balance of evidence, the country did not fare better under the soldiers. In most cases, military rule delivered worse results.^[5]

This article marshals three arguments to make a case for strengthened democracy in Nigeria. 

Soldiers Are Not Better Economic Managers

While Nigerian military regimes faced economic challenges, they weren't uniformly poor managers. General Muhammadu Buhari's (1983–85) austerity measures achieved short-term macroeconomic stability by cutting deficits and curbing inflation, though they caused hardship and didn't fix structural issues. General Ibrahim Babangida's Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was controversial, leading to late 1980s inflation due to reforms. However, SAP was a response to an existing crisis (collapsing oil prices and debt), aiming to correct imbalances and diversify the economy, not just a military decree.^[6][7]

The President Olusegun Obasanjo democratic administration utilised its democratic mandate to negotiate the cancellation of $18 billion of Nigeria's debt with the Paris Club, contingent on a $12 billion repayment and implementing reforms under NEEDS^[8]. This period marked one of the longest runs of sustained economic growth in Nigeria’s history, particularly between 1999 and 2014, when annual GDP growth rates often exceeded 6%. However, this growth was not entirely uninterrupted, as global events like the 2008-2009 financial crisis and the 2014 oil price crash caused significant slowdowns^[9]. While Nigeria’s recent economic trajectory has been challenging, it underscores a broader truth: economic mismanagement has been a recurring issue under both military and civilian governments in Nigeria. 

Table 1: Inflation Under Different Administrations 

Source: Macrotrends^[10] World Bank data^[11]

World Bank analyses show that Nigeria’s persistent poverty and structural weaknesses long predated military regimes and continued after them^[12]. Long-term structural issues like weak institutions, rapid population growth, and external shocks shaped outcomes in both military and civilian periods.^[13] While both kinds of government have experienced both ups and downs, it is worth noting that Nigeria has experienced its longest period of sustained growth under the democratic system of governance. 

Democratic regimes are distinguished by the institutional and enduring nature of the reforms they implement, such as the banking sector reforms under President Obasanjo and subsequent changes in electricity, oil, pensions, and education. This permanence stems from the necessity of achieving full stakeholder buy-in within a democratic system. Furthermore, a key attribute of our democracy is the allowance for governments to self-correct when policies prove unpopular. This is evident in the current environment, where many policies from past administrations are being reversed or significantly modified. While outcomes may vary, the democratic system's crucial feature is the ability of citizens to influence reforms, leading to their amendment or reversal, as demonstrated by the recent national debate over tax reform.^[14] The electoral incentive also drives democracies to become more responsive to the economic needs of the people, a feature of the democratic system that drives governance forward. 

If the argument then is that military leaders are better economic stewards, historical evidence highlights that both systems have faced challenges of corruption, inefficiency, and poor policy implementation, with democracy being slightly better. 

Military Rule Does Not Necessarily Guarantee Better Security

The prevailing Sahel narrative views democracies as too weak to counter insecurity. This has often been used to justify coups. However, the efficacy of military regimes in improving security is doubtful, as illustrated by research from across Africa. Since the 2023 formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) by the juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, their "security-first" strategy, following the expulsion of Western partners, has coincided with a statistically significant rise in violence.^[15]

Political violence has surged, not abated, in the Sahel after the recent coups. Deaths doubled in Burkina Faso after Traoré's 2022 takeover. Mali saw record fatalities in 2024 as UN peacekeepers’ withdrawal created a vacuum. Niger deteriorated sharply post-2023 coup, with the loss of US drone and French intelligence capabilities blinding the state and worsening insecurity in Tillabéri. These trends show military regimes prioritise self-preservation over effective, population-centric solutions to violence.^[16] [17]

Table 2: Security Outcomes Under Military Rule

Sources: ACLED Data^[18], Global Terrorism Index 2024/2025^[19], Security Council Report^[20].

The "enemy-centric" approach to counter-terrorism by the juntas is marked by collective punishment and a lack of civilian oversight, and has fuelled widespread human rights abuses. Credible reports confirm mass killings by state forces and allied militias like the VDP. The April 2023 Karma massacre in Burkina Faso, where over 150 civilians were killed, is a stark example.^[21] The lack of inclusion in the approach to security may be another factor why military governments struggle with security. According to a Brookings Institution report, “Bureaucratic democracies are strongly associated with high levels of human security, while patronage autocracies are associated with low levels. Human security results for institutionally weak or patronage democracies and bureaucratic autocracies are more mixed.” The challenge here is clear: we must make sure our democracies are stronger, not jettison them. ^[22] 

Soldiers Do Not Respect Rights and Freedoms

Democracy's strength lies in empowering citizens to change their system through the ballot, offering a self-correction mechanism absent in military regimes like those in the Sahel. Nigeria's 2015 election, with President Goodluck Jonathan's concession to Muhammadu Buhari, proved the ballot box's power to unseat a failing government. 

Under military rule, the government is not accountable to the people. Citizens are mostly stripped of their voice; the press is usually gagged, and dissent is often criminalised. We must not forget that mechanisms of accountability, such as freedom of expression and the right to protest, are often met with violent repression by military juntas. The ability to criticise the government without fear of arbitrary detention is a luxury of democracy that is the first casualty of a coup.^[23]

It is also important that military rulers usually promise transition to democracy only to gain initial support. They are rarely faithful to the transition timetables. The transition to civil rule in Mali, initially scheduled for February 2022, was indefinitely postponed. Burkina Faso's leader, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, declared in 2023 that elections were "not a priority." He recently disbanded the electoral commission. Military rule does not offer a path to stability; it offers a dead end where the only way to change the government is through another crisis^[24]. 

Strengthening Democracy Remains the Best Option

It must be stressed, however, that the best argument for democracy in Nigeria is not simply that it is a better alternative. Democracy must deliver tangible results beyond abstract ideals. Its durability depends on solving existential challenges and improving citizens' lives. As such, the response to our democratic troubles is that we need to strengthen our democracy to become better. 

A robust democracy first requires restoring public confidence through unimpeachable electoral integrity to encourage civic participation. Simultaneously, it must deliver economic justice; a state presiding over deepening poverty risks authoritarian appeal. Sustainable social security frameworks, not fleeting relief, are necessary for long-term stability. 

A 2017 Brookings report explained why strengthening democracy is better for security: “bureaucratic democracies are strongly associated with high levels of human security while patronage autocracies are associated with low levels.” It then goes further to say, “Other evidence points to the importance of addressing power asymmetries, citizen participation, and rule of law when designing human development policies.” These recommendations are a critical part of democratic systems.^[25]

Nigeria’s democracy is far from perfect, but we must recognise that no democracy today is. The health of democracy is maintained by active citizen participation, a vigilant public and a willingness to hold leaders accountable. 

^[1] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/8/benins-foiled-coup-how-it-unfolded-and-what-we-know  

^[2] https://disinfo.africa/what-lies-behind-the-online-networks-supporting-the-niger-coup-ffd8728d8f28

^[3] https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/africas-coup-contagion-what-driving-rise-military-intervention

^[4] https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/preference-for-democracy-remains-high-in-nigeria-but-dissatisfaction-with-its-quality-is-growing/

^[5]https://www.globalscientificjournal.com/researchpaper/MILITARY_ADMINISTRATION_IN_NIGERIA_29_YEARS_OF_SAD_POLITICAL_EXPERIENCE_AND_DEMOCRATIC_TRUNCATION.pdf

^[6] https://www.elibrary.imf.org/downloadpdf/book/9781557756305/9781557756305.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com

^[7] https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/comp/papers/0312/0312003.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com

^[8] hthe tthe tps://ecdpm.org/work/debt-relief-where-do-we-stand-where-do-we-go-volume-2-issue-1-january-2013/debt-relief-and-development-the-case-of-the-2005-debt-relief-agreement-in-nigeria

^[9] https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/nga/nithe the stabilisedgeria/gdp-growth-rate

^[10] https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/nga/nigeria/inflation-rate-cpi

^[11] https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/nga/nigeria/inflation-rate-cpi

^[12] https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/582991468759320261/pdf/multi0page.pdf?

^[13] https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Global_POVEQ_NGA.pdfMany.;attestpracticeprevikeyare the ous?

^[14] https://share.google/zmFzoYgbEWNQVznGT

^[15]https://www.defensa.gob.es/documents/2073105/2392118/radiografia_de_la_amenaza_yihadista_en_el_sahel_2025_dieeea17_eng.pdf/496db6d8-ab55-bdc1-71d7-a3e0d3cf4ec2?t=1741090650640

^[16] https://www.visionofhumanity.org/shifting-sands-in-security-foreign-counterterrorism-influences-in-the-sahel/

^[17] https://acleddata.com/report/conflict-intensifies-and-instability-spreads-beyond-burkina-faso-mali-and-niger

^[18] https://acleddata.com/report/conflict-intensifies-and-instability-spreads-beyond-burkina-faso-mali-and-niger

^[19] https://www.visionofhumanity.org/shifting-sands-in-security-foeign-counterterrorism-influences-in-the-sahel/

^[20]https://www.defensa.gob.es/documents/2073105/2392118/radiografia_de_la_amenaza_yihadista_en_el_sahel_2025_dieeea17_eng.pdf/496db6d8-ab55-bdc1-71d7-a3e0d3cf4ec2?t=1741090650640

^[21] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/burkina-faso:-la-responsabilite-des-forces-speciales-de-larmee-pointee-dans-le-massacre-de-karma/: 

^[22] https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/fp_20170905_democracy_human_security.pdf

^[23]https://ideas.repec.org/a/ris/ilojbs/0078.html#:~:text=The%20ptotracted%20military%20rule%20and%20its%20tradition,the%20deepening%20of%20democratic%20culture%20in%20Nigeria

^[24] https://www.voaafrica.com/a/burkina-junta-leader-says-elections-not-a-priority-/7292180.html#:~:text=Share-,Share,4%2C%202022

^[25] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/democracy-and-human-security/