By Samuel Ajayi | On 4^th February 2025, President Bola Tinubu signed the North Central Development Commission Bill into law, which brings to six the number of zonal development commissions in Nigeria. With the South South Development Commission—whose bill is yet to be signed—also receiving allocation in the 2025 budget recently passed by the National Assembly, this number is likely to rise to seven soon.

Zonal development commissions, by conception, are designed to provide targeted interventions to the peculiar developmental challenges of the affected zones. However, the track record of existing development commissions raises significant doubts about the efficacy of this approach.

Renowned economist Milton Friedman cautioned against judging policies by their intentions rather than their results. In this context, the proliferation of development commissions for geo-political zones appears to be a potential misstep. The 2025 budget allocates ₦1.57 trillion to these commissions, with varying amounts designated to each. This is a sizeable portion of the budget, representing 2.86% of the budget and amounting to an average of N225 billion per development commission.

Given Nigeria’s history with development commissions and the current fascination with them, it is right to question the necessity and efficacy of these commissions. Will they address the challenges they are meant to tackle or will they create more problems? What is driving the surge in the creation of development commissions, and what lessons can we draw from the past to inform a better approach? These questions are essential to dissect the role and relevance of regional commissions in Nigeria today.

Table 1 Funding and rationale of some selected development commissions

The Origin and Evolution of Development Commissions

The first development commission in Nigeria was the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB), established in 1961 with a 15% federal revenue allocation, aimed at addressing Niger Delta's unique developmental challenges. Th board was a product of one of the recommendations of the 1958 Henry Willink Commission. However, the NDDB had limited impact and was transitioned into the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1993.

OMPADEC itself was dissolved in 1999 for failing to meet its objectives, and replaced with the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000. The goal of NDDC was to combat poverty and ecological degradation in the Niger Delta, which generated 80% of Federation’s revenue at the time. Similarly, the North East Development Commission (NEDC) was created in 2017 to rebuild the region after years of devastation from terrorism and insecurity.

The practice of assigning dedicated funding to the existing zonal commissions sparked demands from other geopolitical zones, leading to a proliferation of development commissions. In 2024, new commissions were created for the North West, South West, and South East geo-political zones. The North Central Development Commission was also recently approved, and the South South Development Commission is on the horizon. While the NDDC and the NEDC are the most well-known of these commissions, the Hydroelectric Power Producing Areas Development Commission (HYPPADEC) is also one of such commissions. Created in 2010 by an act of the National Assembly, HYPPADEC focuses on environmental issues in ten states across three geo-political zones.

The establishment of development commissions in Nigeria often results from a mix of political, economic, and historical factors. These commissions are seen as important tools for tackling zone-specific problems that haven't been properly addressed by existing federal and state institutions.

One of the main reasons for these commissions is the need to address inequalities among the geo-political zones. Nigeria has significant developmental imbalances, with some zones lagging in key areas like poverty reduction, environmental protection, and infrastructure development. Development commissions are seen as a way to direct resources and attention to these specific areas, promoting more balanced growth across the country. The reasoning behind the creation of NDDC and NEDC aligns with this idea. NDDC's justification is tied to the resources the Niger Delta generates for the country which contrasts sharply with the pronounced poverty in the zone and the ecological damage from oil extraction. The situation in the North East also requires special attention. According to UNICEF, the economic loss to the country over 13 years is more than $100 billion.

However, the newer commissions appear to be about distributing resources and political favours.  For instance, it's difficult to justify the South South Development Commission (SSDC) when the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) already exists. While proponents argue that the SSDC would solely focus on the South South states, the overlapping mandates and potential duplication of activities suggest that the SSDC's creation is more about political patronage than genuine development. This raises concerns about potential corruption and misuse of resources, especially since the establishment acts for these commissions do not identify unique challenges that could not be addressed by the federal and state governments.

Some argue that the inefficiencies and weaknesses of state systems have contributed to the demand for development commissions. Many Nigerians believe that existing state structures haven't been effective in addressing urgent developmental issues, leading to calls for more specialized and regionally focused bodies. It has been argued that capacity is much more concentrated at the federal level, and these commissions are a way for the Federal Government to bring that capacity to the state level. Some have also argued that the commissions are percussors of a return to regionalism or that they will foster greater integration within the zones. These remain to be seen.

NDDC: A Bad Advert for Development Commissions

Despite their good intentions, Nigerian zonal development commissions have been hindered by some challenges. Let's look at the NDDC which has inspired the current wave of demand for development commissions. It was established by former President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2000 after its predecessor OMPADEC was shut down. OMPADEC was noted for massive corruption and mismanagement that it was agreed that a new organisation be created to deal with some of the challenges. The NDDC has now existed for about 25 years and there is enough information to judge its impact. So far, the results haven't been great.

Table 2 Similarities between OMPADEC and NDDC

As can be observed from the table above, NDDC was created to address the same issues that OMPADEC was created to address with virtually the same structure but with much more funding. Available records show that NDDC has received over ₦6 trillion^[1] from the Federation. NDDC has often lamented that it struggles with funding and has alleged that the Federal Government owes the organisation over ₦2 trillion^[2], which a director of the organisation stated is the difference between what it received and what it should have received as 15% of the allocation for the nine states since 2000. However, while this may be the case, NDDC also generates substantial revenues from Oil companies. For example, between 2014 and 2019 alone, NDDC received over $3.2 billion as 3% annual budgets of oil companies operating in the oil-producing states. A five-year trend analysis from 2019 to 2023 shows that the NDDC revenue was over ₦1.5 trillion^[3] and Oil companies contributed over 72% of this amount^[4] which indicates that while federal funding may be a challenge, NDDC gets substantial revenues from other sources.

However, NDDC has been plagued by corruption and inefficiency. An investigation in 2019 uncovered extensive financial mismanagement, and a forensic audit found over 13,000 poorly executed and unverified projects, despite the commission receiving around ₦6 trillion between 2001 and 2019. The Auditor-General of the Federation also reported the disappearance of ₦183 billion between 2008 and 2012^[5]. Due to constant changes in leadership and refusal to cooperate with oversight, the true scale of corruption in the organisation is largely unknown. Despite this, NDDC's approved budget has grown massively, from ₦240 billion in 2010 to ₦1.91 trillion in 2024.

In the same vein, NDDC often demonstrates poor governance with the organisation often presenting its budget late into the fiscal year. For example, the 2021 and 2022 budgets of NDDC were only approved in May 2023 due to a dispute between the board and management of the organisation^[6].

This shows a systemic failure in project oversight and financial accountability. Demands for accountability are often ignored, and the last forensic audit of the organisation is yet to be released to the public despite calls from activists and civil society organisations ^[7].

While there has been a noticeable rise in the scale of funding of the organisation, the situation in the Niger Delta remains dire. In the South South geopolitical zone which dominates the area which the NDDC is supposed to serve, poverty is at 62.6%, according to the 2022 Multi-dimensional Poverty Index by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).  This means that at least six in 10 people in the Niger Delta are multi-dimensionally poor. NDDC has not made a dent on the developmental challenges of the zone. The ecological challenges that the zone faces have also not abated. The perception of the public of the NDDC is that of an organisation known for its theatrical corruption.

It can be argued that on at least one core metric, the organisation has not met its intended objectives. This is not to say that there are no notable projects from the organisation. For example, the NDDC has given over 2900^[8] scholarships. Also, its website states that NDDC has carried out over 15,000 programmes and projects across the Niger Delta. It is unlikely that such an organisation would not have any impact. However, the impact of the NDDC is not commensurate to the size of the resources it has received so far.

The NEDC is not any different. Despite receiving significant funding (especially 3% of VAT), the commission has struggled to deliver tangible results. The North East still has a poverty rate of 76%^[9], despite reported allocations to the commission exceeding ₦3 trillion^[10]. There are also reports of corruption and mismanagement of funds at NEDC^[11], and a World Bank assessment highlighting its institutional weaknesses^[12].

The Major Challenges of Development Commissions

Development commissions in Nigeria face major challenges that hinder their effectiveness. These challenges can be grouped into corruption, funding constraints, duplication of mandates, and poor governance structures. While corruption in NDDC has been extensively discussed, similar concerns exist across other commissions. This raises serious questions about financial transparency and governance in these commissions.

Insufficient funding is another major challenge. For instance, the Hydroelectric Power Producing Areas Development Commission (HYPPADEC)^[13], established to tackle environmental problems across 10 states, has been severely underfunded. Unlike larger commissions, HYPPADEC struggles to secure adequate funding, which hinders it from fulfilling its mandate. This reflects a broader issue. Nigeria's current economic climate makes it unlikely that these commissions will receive the necessary funding on a sustainable basis, and this will further impede their ability to execute impactful development projects.

Additionally, there's a significant problem with overlapping mandates. Many commissions have responsibilities that overlap with existing government Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs). If approved, the proposed South South Development Commission (SSDC) might have responsibilities that clash with those of the NDDC. Similarly, unclear boundaries between federal commissions and state governments have led to duplicated projects and wasted resources. Some state governments have expressed concerns over this duplication, noting that this contributes to corruption and inefficiency.

What Can Be Done

Based on the foregoing, the impact of development commissions remains very doubtful, and the obvious takeaway is that they are more ineffectual and serve as a way for funnelling away state resources. An immediate and obvious policy recommendation is to scrap them. Scrapping organisations is not new to Nigerians: OMPADEC, the predecessor to NDDC, was scrapped for the same reasons that now affect the NDDC. The Oronsaye Report had recommended that 38 agencies should be abolished, and the current administration recently scrapped the Ministry of Sports.

Scrapping the development commissions would immediately remedy some of the challenges mentioned earlier, such as bureaucratic bloat and overlapping mandates. But doing that may not be politically feasible. There is an entrenched political constituency for the commissions, as the elites of the geo-political zones see the commissions from the lens of equity and patronage. The instinct of politicians is not to do unpopular things, and this is why the clamour for the scrapping of these commissions, while sound, is not likely to lead to their abolishment. If scrapping these commissions is politically difficult, then we must explore other policy options that make them more effective.

 Several countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and the United States, have experimented with development commissions, with mixed results. Nigeria has the opportunity to learn from both the successes and the failures of these endeavours.

To enhance the efficacy of the zonal commissions, states should be empowered to function as partners. For instance, the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) in the United States utilises a consensus-based model that ensures cooperation between federal and state partners, and incorporates local participation. This directly addresses the challenge of unclear responsibilities by promoting joint ownership of projects. At the moment, each state of the affected zone is represented on the boards of the development commissions; however, many representatives lack a direct connection to the workings of the states they represent. It would be advantageous if the members were members of the state executive councils, such as the commissioner of finance or works in the state, to ensure local endorsement for these organisations and improve the quality of decision-making through informed state representation.

Furthermore, the mandates of development commissions should be redefined to ensure clarity and avoid overlaps with existing MDAs. Coordination between the commissions, MDAs, and state governments should also be strengthened. This would help resolve the issues of duplication and reduce bureaucratic bottlenecks. Another approach to addressing the lack of clarity may be to explicitly define commissions through specific projects rather than the current broad approach. If development commissions are targeted toward developing their geopolitical zones by investing in specific areas such as power, agriculture, or education, they are likely to be more effective. This brings clarity to their mandate which makes quantifying their impact better. The Tenessee Valley authority uses this approach and was created to address the challenges of communities around the Tennessee Valley but with a specific focus on power^[14].

To ensure that development commissions are sustainable, efficient, and not a burden on public finances, it is imperative to find more sustainable and predictable ways of funding them. This can come in the form of project investment or restructuring of the organisations into business entities. We can take a leaf from the Oodua Investment Company which is a company jointly owned by states in the South West. The company has been investing in specific real estate projects in the zone while returning dividends to the states in the zone^[15]. This approach can ensure that these organisations are efficient and driven to seek high-impact projects in the zones they are located in.

This shift toward more sustainable models of funding can minimise the reliance on general public funds and improve financial accountability. Alternatively, the ownership as well as funding of these development commissions could be transferred to their representative states. This would ensure full engagement from the states and a stronger accountability mechanism, as stakeholders would be spread across different states. The DAWN commission^[16], established by the South West states, offers a ready-made model for this approach.

Finally, transparency and accountability must be at the centre of the governance of these commissions. A beneficial ownership register can be created to ensure that contracts awarded are easily tracked by the public. The commissions can also be mandated to embrace open contracting. This will ensure that the public can easily follow how the finances and operations of the development commissions. Civil society organisations and community groups should also be embedded in the oversight of the organisations to ensure and strengthen social accountability. Also, the laws on annual audits of the accounts of the commissions should be enforced, and be further strengthened with requirement for public disclosure of the audited accounts and stiffer penalties on the leadership of the commissions in case of non-compliance or inaccuracies.

In conclusion, zonal development commissions are a political reality.  Demands for them are often driven by political convenience, not necessity. To ensure they are effective and avoid past mistakes, we need a reform-focused approach. This approach should prioritize accountability, coordination, and strategic planning. The proposed solutions offer a way forward, and can turn the commissions into viable vehicles for development of the different zones.

^[1] https://www.arise.tv/nigeria-forensic-audit-uncovers-colossal-mismanagement-of-14-5bn-nddc-funds/

^[2] https://punchng.com/fg-owes-nddc-n2tn-md/

^[3] https://neiti.gov.ng/cms/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/NEITI-FASD-2022-2023-REPORT.pdf

^[4] https://neiti.gov.ng/cms/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/NEITI-FASD-2022-2023-REPORT.pdf

^[5] https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/188697-nddc-diverted-n183bn-niger-delta-development-money-auditor-general-insists.html?tztc=1

^[6] https://www.vanguardngr.com/2023/05/senate-approves-n1-4-trillion-as-2021-2022-budget-for-nddc-2/

^[7] https://dailytrust.com/penalise-those-hiding-nddc-forensic-audit-report/

^[8] https://www.nddc.gov.ng/News/NewsDetails/2491

^[9] https://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/elibrary/read/1241254

^[10] https://thesun.ng/poor-project-execution-apc-chieftain-cautions-md-nedc-over-poor-performance/#google_vignette

^[11] https://punchng.com/groups-allege-n146bn-fraud-in-nedc/

^[12]https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099050302092211160/P1682830fd102e040a1e9036548a96e1f4.docx

^[13] https://www.nhyppadec.gov.ng/

^[14] https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/tennessee-valley-authority-act#:~:text=The%20new%20agency%20was%20asked,the%20region's%20business%20and%20farming

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^[15] https://punchng.com/odua-investment-posts-n1-9bn-profit-before-tax/#:~:text=Odu'a%20Investment%20Company%20Limited,68bn%20in%202022%20to%20N3.

^[16] https://dawncommission.org/